One of the things which is perfectly obvious about societies which have achieved high degrees of industrialization is that they have acquired unusual skills in problem-solving activities. Industrial societies have learned how to solve certain kinds of problems, and understanding this creative capacity is basic to an understanding of the growth process. What is less obvious, however, is that the developed countries never solve more than a small fraction of the problems they are capable of solving. Rather, they solve some fraction of the problems which happen to be formulated and actively pursued. This suggests that our understanding of the process of technological change may be advanced by exploring the manner in which problems are formulated at the firm level. This paper is intended as a sort of historical reconnaissance mission. It represents an attempt to establish certain generalizations concerning the problem-solving process in industrializing countries in the past two centuries. Our interest is in the forces which provide inducements to technical change, and in examining these forces-what Hirschman has called "inducement mechanism"' -we will not confine ourselves to the more conventional framework of economic reasoning. Indeed, the present paper has been prompted in some measure by the extreme agnosticism to which one is led on the subject of technological change by recent theorizing. It used to be thought possible to explain the factor-saving bias, which inventions took, in purely economic terms. It will be recalled that Hicks stated, in his Theory of Wages:
intent and motivation in these terms. Their contemporaries, especially in the nineteenth century, employed similar explanations with almost monotonous regularity.
Perhaps what is needed is to break out of an excessively restrictive competitive framework and to approach the problem of technological change from different vantage points. The present paper will therefore look for clues to the process of technological change in several areas of the historical experience of the past century and a half or so. It will pose the question: have there been forces at work in recent history which have in fact pushed exploratory activity in specific directions?4 Nothing will be proven since historical examples by themselves prove nothing; hopefully, however, a beginning will be made toward a better understanding of some of the mechanisms which initiate and direct exploratory activities. I It will be argued first that, in looking for the origins of technological changes in the manufacturing sector, the technological level itself has been badly neglected. What will be said should not be confused with a crude form of technological determinism, where social, economic, and political changes are explained in terms of antecedent changes in technology. Rather, what is asserted is that technology is much more of a cumulative and self-generating process than the economist generally recognizes. Technological change, when approached from the point of view of economic theory, is likely to be treated as a realm which passively adjusts to the pressures and signals of economic forces, mediated through the market place and through factor prices in particular. The opposite danger, to which the following remarks are subject, is that they will be interpreted as saying that economic forces do not condition the direction in which technological changes move. Our position, then, is that the ultimate incentives are economic in nature; but economic incentives to reduce cost always exist in business operations, and precisely because such incentives are so diffuse and general they do not explain very much in terms of the particular sequence and timing of innovative activity. The trouble with the economic incentives to technical change, as an explanatory variable, is precisely that they are so pervasive. In the realm of pure theory, a decision maker bent upon maximizing profits under competitive conditions will pursue any possibility for reducing costs, regardless of which factor will be economized on. What forces, then, determine the directions in which a firm actually goes in exploring for new techniques? Since it cannot explore in all directions, what are the factors which induce it to strike out in 4 In general, we would expect individual countries or regions to excel in innovations which constitute technical solutions to specific problems of special importance to them.
Thus it is hardly surprising that pioneer America made major contributions to the improvement of the ax, or that contemporary Britain should assume world leadership in the development of techniques for the fully automatic landing of airplanes in dense fog. a particular direction? Better yet, are there any factors at work which compel it to look in some directions rather than others?
In answering this question it may be necessary to modify the model of the maximizing firm to recognize explicitly real-world forces which constrain and otherwise influence its behavior. Within the realm of exploratory activities which may yield new, cost-reducing techniques, where does the firm place its resources? Some firms no doubt are able to take a very long time horizon and survey, with equanimity and fine impartiality, the whole spectrum of possibilities. But most firms-or at least most decision makers-are under pressure to undertake actions which promise a payoff in a relatively short time period and with at least most of the constraints imposed by the existing plant. They are confronted with the existing range of productive activities as an inevitable starting point. They are naturally led to search the technological horizon, as it were, within the framework of these current activities and to attack the most restrictive constraint. My primary point is that most mechanical productive processes throw off signals of a sort which are both compelling and fairly obvious; indeed, these processes when sufficiently complex and interdependent, involve an almost compulsive formulation of problems. These problems capture a large proportion of the time and energies of those engaged in a search for improved techniques.
Such signals have not, of course, been confined to the industrial sector of the economy. In agriculture, for example, the mechanization of reaping may be said to have been effectively "signalled" by the compelling and obvious need to harvest the wheat crop within a very limited number of days in order to prevent spoilage.5 Nevertheless, it seems to be a historical generalization, with which this paper is in fact much concerned, that such signalling has been more conspicuously effective in the industrial sector.
It will be argued that complex technologies create internal compulsions and pressures which, in turn, initiate exploratory activity in particular directions. These pressures operate at the plant level and also often within the components of the final product itself. The improved designs of automobile engines have led-through the achievement of higher speeds-to the invention of improved braking systems. The need for such systems-or perhaps one should say the penalty for failing to provide such a system along with a more powerful engine-was painfully obvious to all automotive engineers (if not to all drivers). Similarly, to someone constructing a hi-fi system it is obvious that the benefits of a high-quality amplifier are lost if it is attached to a low-quality loudspeaker.6 An understanding of these interdependencies may help us to understand better than we do the path and the process of technological change.
The notion of compulsive sequences will not be new to economic historians. Reference to the imbalances in the relation between machines is virtually de rigueur in any treatment of the English cotton textile industry in the eighteenth century (Kay's flying shuttle led to the need for speeding up spinning operations; the eventual innovations in spinning in turn created the shortage of weaving capacity which finally culminated in Cartwright's introduction of the power loom).7
In a sense the capital goods sector is always being bombarded with messages of the sort that say: "I expect to be able to earn a profit if I can produce a new device which will conform to certain specifications. But no machinery now exists which can produce such a device. Therefore you can earn a profit by devising and selling machines which will produce according to these specifications. Do so." The early prototype for this relationship was James Watt's protracted search for a cylinder bored to a minimum degree of accuracy in its diameter. The required degree of precision was eventually attained with the use of John Wilkinson's boring mill, and the commercial practicability of the steam engine really dates from the use of this mill in preparing cylinders.8 This backward linkage, to use Hirschman's terminology, has been an enormously important source of technical change in the Western world, and it can be argued that a responsive machinery-producing industry has been the key to successful industrialization. My concern, however, is not primarily with the historical responsiveness of certain supply factors but with the manner in which the demand for new techniques emerges and is perceived. 
II
Let us consider some historical episodes. In the early 1890s, at the beginning of the bicycle craze, the machining of bicycle-wheel hubs posed a serious production problem. Forming tools, which previous to 1890 had been applied to metals of soft composition, such as the caps of salt and pepper boxes, were successfully applied to hardened metals in the shaping of the outside of the wheel hubs. However, this use of the forming tool created an imbalance between the operations carried on for the outside and the inside of the hub. Since the forming tool now worked more rapidly on the outside of the hub than the conventional drills worked on the inside, it was not possible to derive the fullest gains from the use of the forming tool. This imbalance was eventually corrected by the introduction of the oil-tube drill. This drill had an oil channel leading to or near the point, and it made possible the lubrication and cooling of cutting edges as well as the removal of chips, and therefore speeded up drilling operations. In doing so, the oil-tube drill corrected the initial imbalance and brought about a closer synchronization between the operations on the outside and the inside of the hub.10 A similar sort of technical imbalance between interdependent processes led to important improvements in the internal structure of the Bessemer converter. The early Bessemer converters required a considerable amount of expensive, auxiliary equipment. This equipment was utilized only a small percentage of the time, partly because the bottom of the converter wore out, due to the extreme temperatures of the process, after one to three heats. At that point the converter had to be allowed to cool so that a man could climb inside and repair the lining. Alexander Holley addressed himself directly to correcting this imbalance by devising ways of speeding up the use of the converter. His eventual solution was a removable shell for the bottom of the converter which made it unnecessary to let the converter cool and therefore led to a considerable saving of time and reduction in costs. 1 According to Bessemer's own testimony, the search activity which led The introduction of high-speed steel into the machine tool industry constitutes a major example of technological imbalance. High-speed steel is a steel alloy (combined with tungsten, vanadium, and chromium) which raised enormously the red hardness of cutting tools1 a and therefore made it possible to remove metal by cutting at dramatically higher speeds and also by taking heavier cuts in the metal. High-speed steel was first developed by Frederick W. Taylor and his associates and exhibited in operation at the Paris Exposition of 1900. "At that exhibition they exhibited tools made of this steel, in use in a heavy and powerful lathe, taking heavy cuts at unheard of speeds-80, 90 or 100 feet per minute, instead of the 18 to 22 feet per minute that previously had been the maximum for heavy cuts in hard material."14 It turned out, however, that it was impossible to take advantage of higher cutting speeds with machine tools designed for the older carbon steel cutting tools because they could not withstand the stresses and strains or provide sufficiently high speeds in the other components of the machine tool. As a result, the availability of high-speed steel for the cutting tool quickly generated a complete redesign in machine tool components-the structural, transmission, and control elements. As one machine tool authority put it: "During the first decade of the 20th century we see high-speed steel revolutionizing the lathe-as it does all production machine tools. Beds and slides rapidly become heavier, feed works stronger, and the driving cones are designed for much wider belts than of old. The legs of big lathes grow shorter and shorter, and finally disappear as the beds grow down to the floor. On these big machines massive tool blocks take the place of tool posts, and multiple tooling comes into vogue."1 s The final effect of this redesigning which was initiated by the use of high-speed steel in cutting tools was to transform machine tools into much heavier, faster, and more rigid instruments which, in turn, enlarged considerably the scope of their practical operations and facilitated their introduction into new uses. Much of the progress in machine tools resulted from the generation of imbalances between the machine itself and the cutting tool. Improvements in the cutting tool required machines of greater strength, rigidity, capacity to withstand stress, etc. Improvements in the design and operation of the machines, in turn, were useless without improvements in the properties of the cutting tool.1 6
In this exploratory activity, however, which was initiated to accommodate the new requirements of high-speed steel, inventions were made which went far beyond the need merely to make such accommodations. The need to adapt speeds and feeds to the enlarged cutting capacity of the tool was a major stimulus to the development of new speed-changing devices. For example, the cone pulley, a primitive device fbr altering the speed of the machine tool in accordance with the requirements of the work in hand, was replaced by much more sophisticated gear-change devices which enabled the operator to vary the speed merely by shifting a lever. In an important article Einstein stated: "Meanwhile high-speed steel had appeared on the market, which revolutionized the machine-tool industry. Cutting speeds of the various tools could materially be increased with this new material, and at the same time higher rates of traverse of tool or work could be used. This resulted in the development of the so-called single-pulley machine which adopted the positive-gear-change mechanism of the feedbox and used it for the drive of the machine. These new types of machines, heavier in structure, with a exploratory activities. Such activities are undertaken in response to certain kinds of stimuli, and although the stimuli must presumably exceed some minimum magnitude in order to be perceived and acted upon, the "size" of the discovery need bear no systematic relationship to the "size" of the initial stimulus.
In the case of machine tools, the interdependence is of four component parts. In addition to the cutting tool itself there are:
1. Structural or frame elements whose function it is to carry or support work and tool. 2. Transmission elements which give the work or tool, or both, movements for shaping the work to be produced. 3. Control elements for both adjusting the structural elements relatively to each other and controlling the function of the transmission for moving either tool or work or both.18
This sequence-changes in one component of an interdependent system creating a stimulus for changes elsewhere in this system-has been a highly fruitful source of technical change in the machine tool industry. Awareness of imbalances between components has continually led to an exploration of possibilities for corrective action whose eventual result was major improvements in productivity. The imbalance between high-speed cutting tools and the lathe was exactly duplicated in the relationship between milling cutters and milling machines from the 1880s to the early years of the twentieth century. Thus Woodbury tells us: A recent book summarizes the resulting changes in the British Navy as follows: "The guns used at Inkerman and Balaclava did not differ greatly from those which had been used at Torres Vedras or Waterloo; and in the fleet which sailed to the Crimea, the standard armament of the line-of-battle ship was a 32-pounder smoothbore, firing a shot with a velocity of 1,600 feet per second, mounted upon a crude wooden carriage with a recoil controlled by the friction of large wooden axles, and served by a crew so large that they practically hid their unwieldy little weapon from sight..... By the late Eighties all this was changed. The guns were changed; as early as the Seventies Britain was building a improvements in the trebuchet, the medieval artillery piece, it became apparent in the thirteenth century that further improvements in accuracy could not be achieved unless the projectile itself was altered.
... the very fact that the power of a trebuchet could be so nicely regulated impelled Western military engineers to seek even greater exactitude in artillery attack. They quickly saw that until the weight of projectiles and their friction with the air could be kept uniform, artillery aim would still be variable. As a result, as early as 1244 stones for trebuchets were being cut in the royal arsenals of England calibrated to exact specifications established by an engineer: in other words, the cannon ball before the cannon.2 3
Part of the reason for the effectiveness of technological disequilibria in inducing innovations is that they involved compulsive sequences. The relationship among components was usually such that some imbalance had to be corrected before an initial innovation could be fully exploited. 24 Why, one might be inclined to ask, have such disequilibria been most important
III
The apparent recalcitrance of nineteenth-century English labor, especially skilled labor, in accepting the discipline and the terms of factory employment provided an inducement to technical change which was in many ways analogous to the technical disequilibria discussed so far. The most important point is that the threat of worker noncompliance-in the last resort, strikes-served as a powerful agent in focusing the attention of decision makers on obvious and major threats to their profit positions. Here again it may be said that employers had a general, diffuse economic incentive to reduce costs, regardless of which factor inputs were being economized on. But it was also obvious that the labor input was the one which posed the greatest threat, in that its services were likely to be withheld at times and in ways which constituted a serious threat to a firm's profit prospects. The threat of such withdrawals, then, was a powerful force in directing energies in a search for labor-saving machines.
The view was widely expressed in nineteenth-century England, especially in the period 1820-60, that strikes were a major reason for innovations. Contemporary observers who agreed on little else, who were as far apart in their ideological biases and commitments as, say, Karl Marx and Samuel Smiles, were in complete accord on this point. We have, moreover, the evidence of numerous inventors themselves, who testified that they undertook the search process which led to a particular invention as the result of a strike or the threat of a strike.
In the Poverty of Philosophy, Marx stated:
In England, strikes have regularly given rise to the invention and application of new machines. Machines were, it may be said, the weapon employed by the capitalists to quell the revolt of specialized labour. The self-acting mule, the greatest invention of modern industry, put out of action the spinners who were in revolt. If combinations and strikes had no other effect than that of making the efforts of mechanical genius react against them, they would still exercise an immense influence on the development of industry. In Capital, Marx stated: "It would be possible to write quite a history of the inventions, made since 1830, for the sole purpose of supplying capital with weapons against the revolts of the working-class."26 Here again he asserted that the most important of these inventions was Richard Roberts's self-acting mule, because it "opened up a new epoch in the automatic system."'27 Roberts's mule was invented in 1825 as the result of a strike on the part of the skilled and highly independent mule-spinners. A delegation of Manchester cotton manufacturers appealed to Roberts to help them in their desperate plight, and Roberts's inventive skill brought forth the self-acting mule. This famous episode was dwelt upon at some length, not only by Marx, but by Smiles2 8 and Ure, who concluded his discussion by stating, in one of his inimitable didactic excursions, "that when capital enlists science in her service, the refractory hand of labour will always be taught docility."2 9
Another of Roberts's important inventions, the so-called Jacquard punchirig machine, owed its origin to somewhat similar circumstances. greatly hampered by combinations amongst the workmen, and they despaired of being able to finish the girders within the time specified in the contract. The punching of the iron plates by hand was a tedious and expensive as well as an inaccurate process; and the work was proceeding so slowly that the contractors found it absolutely necessary to adopt some new method of punching if they were to finish the work in time. In their emergency they appealed to Mr. Roberts, and endeavored to persuade him to take the matter up. He at length consented to do so, and evolved the machine in question during his evening's leisure-for the most part while quietly sipping his tea. The machine was produced, the contractors were enabled to proceed with the punching of the plates independent of the refractory men, and the work was executed with a despatch, accuracy, and excellence that would not otherwise have been possible" (Smiles, Industrial Biography, pp. 271-72). Babbage (and others) attributed the invention of the system of grooved rollers for rolling skelps for musket barrels to a strike of the gun-skelp forgers who were, in substantial measure, superseded by the invention. He points out also that the technique of welding the skelps into a finished gun barrel was perfected as a result of difficulties encountered with a combination of workers.34
The uncertainties which the supply of labor posed in the British gunmaking industry eventually led to the first large-scale borrowing of American technology by the Old World. For the British government's demand for firearms was not only highly erratic but also, in time of national emergency, highly inelastic. Since military firearms, up to the 1850s, were produced entirely by skilled craftsmen whose supply was certainly highly inelastic in the short run, the entry of the government into the market almost invariably led to strikes or threats of strikes unless wages were raised substantially. This situation resulted in an almost complete breakdown in supplies of firearms on the eve of the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. In its determination to free itself from what it regarded as an intolerable dependence on a small number of skilled workers, the British government sent a commission to the United States to examine American gunmaking machinery. This commission purchased large quantities of machines which were set up at the Enfield Arsenal. The purchase marked the introduction of American mass-production technology into Europe, where the system was long referred to as the "American System of Manufacturing." iently summarized Nasmyth's views as follows: "Mr. Nasmyth, the well-known inventor strikes or fear of strikes have served, historically, as a powerful agent for directing the search for new techniques in a particular direction. The preoccupation with substituting capital for labor (especially skilled labor) was more than just a matter of wage rates. Perhaps even more important was the great nuisance value of strikes. In part at least, entrepreneurial behavior must be understood in terms of an aversion to the uncertainties presented by strike possibilities whose disruptive effects were regarded as intolerable intrusions into the domain of managerial decision making and responsibility.39
IV
There is a third category of mechanisms which seems to have been important, historically, in providing successful inducements to technical change. Perhaps the most general way of expressing it is that an accustomed source of supply was, for some reason, cut off or drastically reduced, causing major disruption due to the unavailability either of alternative sources of supply or of satisfactory substitutes. The most common cause of such disruption, of course, has been the outbreak of war. In each case the imposition of a previously nonexistent contraint led to a search activity out of which a satisfactory or superior substitute, or more productive process, eventually emerged.
Thus, France's early commercial leadership in the synthetic alkali industry, developed upon the Leblanc process, owed a great deal to the fact that France was cut off from its supplies of Spanish barilla during the Napoleonic Wars.40 o An eminent observer, Robert Owen, said more generally in describing the effect of the Napoleonic Wars: "The want of hands and materials created a demand for and gave great encouragement to new mechanical inventions and chemical discoveries, to supersede manual labour in supplying the materials required for warlike purposes. profits hardly needs to be said. But the ordinary messages of the marketplace are general and not sufficiently specific. The market rewards reductions in cost, but this is true of all reductions in cost, wherever attained. It does not specify the directions in which cost reductions should be sought. The mechanisms examined here share the property of forcefully focusing attention in specific directions. They called attention decisively to the existence of problems the solutions to which were within the capacity of society at the time, and which had the effect of either increasing profits or preventing a decline that was anticipated with a high degree of probability.
These and other focusing devices deserve more careful examination in any serious exploration of the sources of technological change. It would be very interesting to examine, for example, the learning experiences and other creative opportunities associated with accidents and other disasters. Our ancestors, who had not yet taken to the air or experienced the fearful carnage of a motorized age,s 2 were nevertheless plagued by exploding boilers, collapsing bridges, and sinking ocean-going vessels. Although the cost was very high, much information was gleaned from these accidents,s a but, perhaps more important, they powerfully dramatized weaknesses in existing techniques and thus provided a strong impulse to research efforts. Disasters such as fires at sea were almost always followed by a rush of patent applications for devices which purportedly would prevent their recurrence.5 4 Nobel's invention of dynamite, a comparatively safe explosive, owed much to the unfortunate 54 "It is noteworthy that sensational accidents or unusual occurrences are followed immediately by a large influx of applications for patents connected in some way with them, tendency of his shipments of nitroglycerin to explode in transit aboard railroad trains or, in some spectacular instances, in midocean.s s The nearly disastrous bursting of a hydraulic cylinder due to the enormous pressure to which it was subjected during the raising of the Britannia tubular bridge across the Menai Straits led directly to major advances in knowledge concerning the crystallography of metals. The new knowledge thus gained resulted in important improvements in design over a range of objects wherein cylinders were subjected to severe internal pressures, for example, cast-iron guns.5 6 All the cases dealt with have a common denominator in the expectation of profit, but in all cases also there are forces pointing emphatically in certain directions. This is the underlying unity. The inducement mechanism is the prospect of making extra-high profits, or the unbearable prospect of losing a marvelous and tangible opportunity to do so, just as in the cases of strikes and wars the mechanism is the unbearable prospect of being put out of business or having one's attempt at a more orderly planning process reduced to chaos. The kinds of agonizing uncertainties created by the imminent danger of a strike cannot be adequately reduced, as they often are in modern decision theory, to a probabilistic treatment. Probabilistic statements, by definition, do not apply to single events but only to classes of events. The employer, faced by a strike next week, cannot necessarily console himself with the thought that his situation is an unlikely one, and concentrate his attention on the mathematical expectation of the future. If the strike takes place, there may be no future-at least for his firm. It may well even be that the apparently irrational determination of so many nineteenth-century firms to introduce labor-saving innovations (irrational from the point of view of modern theory) really arose from their determination to engage in rational long-term planning-a procedure which was impossible as long as strike possibilities by indispensable skilled personnel hung like a sword of Damocles over their heads. 1963], p. 18). As a signaling device, the threat to the established political order which is implicit in a failure to take a remedial-or at least amelioratory--action is similar to the threat to a business firm which fails to respond to a direct threat to its profit position. 
